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The SEC, Administrative Usurpation,  
and Insider Trading 
A.C. Pritchard* 
The history of insider trading law is a tale of administrative usurpation and 
legislative acquiescence. Congress has never enacted a prohibition against 
insider trading, much less defined it. Instead, the SEC has led in defining insider 
trading, albeit without the formality of rulemaking, and subject to varying 
degrees of oversight by the courts. The reason why lies in the deference that the 
Supreme Court gave to the SEC in its formative years.  
The roots of insider trading law are commonly traced to the SEC’s decision 
in Cady, Roberts & Co.1 Cady, Roberts was only made possible, however, by the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in SEC v. Chenery Corp., its first brush with insider 
trading under the federal securities laws. In Chenery I, Justice Felix Frankfurter, 
writing for a slim majority, rebuffed the SEC’s attempt to impose a crude insider 
trading ban in a reorganization proceeding of public utility holding company.2 
The alleged insider traders in Chenery I were managers of a holding company 
who had acquired preferred stock during the course of the reorganization.3 As 
Justice Frankfurter characterized the SEC’s rule of decision, the managers “were 
fiduciaries and hence under a ‘duty of fair dealing’ not to trade in the securities 
of the corporation while plans for its reorganization were before the 
Commission.”4 The SEC rejected a plan put forward by the company that called 
for the managers’ preferred stock to be converted into common stock.5 
The SEC’s invocation of “fiduciary” responsibility provoked a now well-
known lecture from Frankfurter on legal reasoning: 
 
* Frances and George Skestos Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I wish to 
acknowledge the generous support of the William W. Cook Endowment of the 
University of Michigan. 
 1. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
 2. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 89-90 (1943). 
 3. Id. at 81-82. 
 4. Id. at 85. 
 5. Id. 
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[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further 
inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? 
In what respect has he failed to discharge those obligations? And what are the 
consequences of his deviation from duty? 6  
The SEC had not answered these questions. The agency had not found that the 
insiders “acted covertly or traded on inside knowledge” but nevertheless 
concluded that they had violated “broad equitable principles” recognized in 
earlier judicial decisions.7 The SEC’s reliance on precedent meant that it could 
also be constrained by those decisions. The SEC would not necessarily be bound 
by judicial precedents, Frankfurter conceded, had the agency promulgated new 
rules.8 But having “professed to decide the case before it according to settled 
judicial doctrines, its action must be judged by [those] standards . . . .”9  
Justice Frankfurter suggested a willingness to defer to the SEC’s “experience 
and insight” but hinted that deference would require the SEC “promulgate[] a 
general rule.”10 This divided Frankfurter from his more liberal colleagues, 
Justices Hugo Black, Frank Murphy, and Stanley Reed, who rejected “[t]he 
intimation . . . that the Commission can act only through general formulae 
rigidly adhered to.”11 They argued that the SEC enjoyed “wide powers to evolve 
policy standards, and this may well be done case by case . . . .”12  
On remand, the SEC responded by reaching the same result while 
substituting a different rationale. When Chenery returned to the Court, 
Frankfurter complained to Black:  
 
 6. Id. at 85-86. 
 7. Id. at 86-87. 
 8. Id. at 89 (“Congress certainly did not mean to preclude the formulation by the 
Commission of standards expressing a more sensitive regard for what is right and what 
is wrong than those prevalent at the time the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 
1935 became law.”).  
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 92. Chief Justice Stone suggested a more explicit endorsement of rulemaking. 
Handwritten Note from Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to Justice Felix Frankfurter 
(undated) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Harvard Law School Library). 
Frankfurter demurred: 
I agree with you that had the SEC summarized their experience by putting the specific ruling 
in the Chenery case into a generalized rule, a totally different situation would have been 
created. But I thought it wiser to indicate that by innuendo rather than explicitly. To do the 
latter might be read by the Commission as a broad hint from us to issue a regulation. Thereby 
we would be stimulating new problems. 
  Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone (Jan. 23, 1943) 
(on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Harvard Law School Library). 
 11. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 99 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 12. Id. at 100. 
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[T]he Commission has decided this case ad hoc without any reference to 
considerations that would govern it in the same case tomorrow. . . . The SEC is not 
a Kadi sitting under a tree, dispensing judgment in each case, unrelated to general 
considerations.13 
Unmoved by Frankfurter’s charge of lawlessness, Murphy, Black, and Reed 
were now joined by new Justices Wiley Rutledge and Harold Burton to uphold 
the SEC’s action. The Chenery II majority explicitly rejected Frankfurter’s 
suggestion that the agency should proceed by rulemaking: “[T]he choice made 
between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that 
lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”14 
A generation later, a newly activist SEC, under the leadership of Chairman 
William Cary, exploited the policymaking freedom afforded by Chenery II when 
it launched its modern campaign against insider trading under Rule 10b-5 in 
Cady, Roberts.15 The Commission had adopted Rule 10b-5 under its Section 10(b) 
authority as a general antifraud prohibition, but neither the rule nor the statute 
mentions insider trading.16 Notwithstanding these omissions, the SEC found in 
Cady, Roberts that a partner in a brokerage firm had violated Rule 10b-5 when he 
shared non-public information with his firm, which traded on the information. 
Cary set out a broad prohibition of insider trading:  
[T]he obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a 
relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, 
and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such 
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing. 17  
These elements are conspicuously absent from the text of Rule 10b-5 and Section 
10(b). Moreover, Congress did not anticipate such a prohibition when it adopted 
Section 10(b). Congress was well aware of the problem of insider trading in 1934, 
a topic highlighted at length by Ferdinand Pecora in the legislative hearings that 
led to the passage of the Securities Exchange Act.18 But Congress addressed the 
issue, albeit in a somewhat mechanical way, in Section 16 of the Act.19   
 
 13. Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Hugo Black (Dec. 23, 1946) (on file with 
the Robert Jackson Collection, Library of Congress).  
 14. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947). 
 15. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
 16. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), ch. 404, 48 Stat. 891 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2015)); 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2015). 
 17. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912 (footnote omitted). 
 18. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 77-78 (3d ed. 
2003). 
 19. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 896 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78p (2015)). 
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Undeterred by the lack of textual support, Cary proclaimed that the 
“elements [of § 10(b)] under the broad language of the anti-fraud 
provisions . . . are not to be circumscribed by fine distinctions and rigid 
classifications.”20 The SEC would interpret the securities laws as needed to root 
out information asymmetries in the secondary markets to protect “the buying 
public . . . from the misuse of special information.”21 Statutory literalism would 
not be an impediment.  
Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court would endorse Cary’s free-ranging 
interpretive approach in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.22 Capital Gains, 
although turning on an interpretation of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,23 
also gave the green light to the SEC to push the boundaries of its power generally 
by validating an open-ended notion of fiduciary duty: “Congress intended the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to be construed like other securities legislation 
‘enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds,’ not technically and restrictively, but 
flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.”24 Moreover, Capital Gains suggested 
that the SEC could expand its power through agency and judicial interpretation 
of existing statutes and regulations without cumbersome rulemaking or, still 
more burdensome, seeking legislation.25 
After the validation of its interpretive approach in Capital Gains, the SEC 
turned to the courts to pursue its campaign against insider trading. Four years 
later, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the Second Circuit validated the SEC’s 
expansive reading of Rule 10b-5. 26  
The stakes had escalated when the Supreme Court reentered the fray in 
Chiarella v. United States,
27a criminal case. But by that time the Court’s makeup 
had changed from the heady days of Capital Gains, most notably with the 
addition of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who would write the restrictive decisions 
in both Chiarella and Dirks v. SEC.28 In Chiarella, Powell construed Cady, Roberts 
and Texas Gulf Sulphur narrowly to fit into his common law framework.29 
Powell made an uneasy peace with Capital Gains, adopting its equitable notions 
of fraud, but imposing a technical and restrictive approach to interpretation 
 
 20. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. 
 21. Id. at 913. 
 22. 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
 23. 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2015)). 
 24. Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 195 (quoting 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 382 (3d 
ed. 1943)). 
 25. Id. at 199. 
 26. 401 F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). 
 27. 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980). 
 28. 463 U.S. 646, 648 (1983). 
 29. See A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy for the 
Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 18-19 (1998). 
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rejected by that case. The result was a more limited insider trading prohibition 
than the government would have liked. Conspicuously, Powell made no effort 
to cabin Chenery II; despite the criminal context, he did not suggest that the lack 
of a statutory basis or rulemaking was an impediment to creating an insider 
trading prohibition.30  
The narrow construction of tipping liability in Dirks followed from the 
principles Powell set down in Chiarella. The deception required by Rule 10b-5 
arose from traditional standards of fiduciary duty, focused closely on self-
dealing: “whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from 
his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to 
stockholders.”31 But as in Chiarella, Powell did not call for legislation or 
rulemaking, thereby making the Court further complicit in the SEC’s 
development of an insider trading prohibition under Rule 10b-5. 
In United States v. Salman, the Court will once again build on the common 
law of insider trading.32 Salman is an easy case on the merits. The inference that 
a tipper receives an indirect personal benefit when he passes information to his 
brother, or (indirectly) his brother-in-law, as occurred in Salman, is a natural 
one. Maher Kara thought of himself as his brother’s keeper; caring for him was 
a benefit to Maher, as it would be for anyone in a loving family relationship.33 
But if the result in Salman is easy, the opinion will be a challenging one to write 
if the Court wants to clarify the law of insider trading.  
The Court has brought this drafting difficulty on itself, having denied 
certiorari in the case that actually raised the critical issue: United States v. 
Newman.34 In Newman, the Second Circuit overturned the convictions of two 
hedge fund managers who received material nonpublic information via an 
extended tipping chain. Newman adopted a narrow definition of the “personal 
benefit” required by Dirks to establish a breach of duty by the tipper. An 
acquaintance between a tipper and tippee was not enough: there had to be “proof 
of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is 
objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary 
or similarly valuable nature.”35 The Government’s petition for certiorari in 
Newman argued that the Second Circuit’s holding “cannot be reconciled with 
 
 30. He did suggest in private correspondence that legislation would be appropriate. See A.C. 
Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 
52 DUKE L.J. 841, 934 (2003). 
 31. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662. 
 32. 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016). 
 33. See id. at 1092. 
 34. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015). Newman had its own 
limitations as a vehicle for Supreme Court review; the convictions in that case also 
foundered on the defendants’ lack of knowledge of the personal benefit provided to the 
tippers by their initial tippees. Id. at 454-55.  
 35. Id. at 452. 
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Dirks, which did not require an ‘exchange’ to find liability for a gift of inside 
information and did not impose amorphous standards for the relationships that 
can support liability.”36  
The Government overreads Newman, divorcing it from its facts. The 
relationships between the tippers and their initial tippees in Newman fell far 
short of the familial relationship in Salman. More to the point, the Government 
is clearly overstating the holding of Dirks. Dirks did not spell out the “standards 
for the relationship that can support liability” for insider trading. Laying down 
such standards was not necessary to decide the case: Dirks had no relationship 
with Secrist, his insider source. Rather, the cautious Powell left the details of the 
required relationship for future cases. Newman addressed that issue in a case that 
called for its resolution. Salman does not. If the Court feels it should decide only 
the case before it (a possibility, if the Court remains shorthanded without a 
replacement for the late Justice Antonin Scalia), the contours of insider trading 
doctrine will remain murky after Salman. Salman will go to jail, but little else 
will be resolved. 
In prior cases, however, the Court has not been satisfied to simply decide the 
case before it. The Court’s best-known trilogy in the area—Chiarella, Dirks, and 
United States v. O’Hagan
37—ranged widely in defining the law of insider trading. 
In Chiarella and Dirks, Powell reframed the Rule 10b-5 insider trading 
prohibition around his preferred common law architecture, attempting to 
constrain overreaching by the SEC and DOJ.38 After Powell’s departure, Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s O’Hagan opinion exploited the openings in Powell’s 
edifice to expand the insider trading prohibition.39 (A common law approach 
does allow room to maneuver if the Court is bent on expansion.) So Salman could 
say something meaningful—either narrow or broad—if the Court decides to 
assert itself. If the Court decides to tackle the personal benefit issue head on, what 
should it do? 
The appeal of the Government’s basic argument—that there should be no 
qualifier on “gift” or “friend”—is that it offers a bright-line test. If you give 
someone valuable information knowing they might trade on it, at a minimum 
you have breached a duty of confidentiality. And since no one gives something 
for nothing, the jury should presume there was a reciprocal benefit to the 
tipper.40 This version of the personal benefit test would be easy for a jury to 
 
 36. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14, Newman, 136 S. Ct. 242 (No. 15-137) (quoting 
Newman, 773 F.3d at 452). 
 37. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 38. See Pritchard, supra note 30, at 936-42. 
 39. See 521 U.S. at 642. 
 40. The Seventh Circuit has come close to presuming the intention to make a gift from the 
fact of disclosure. See SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 633 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Absent some 
legitimate reason for Ferrero’s disclosure . . . the inference that Ferrero’s disclosure was 
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apply.41 If the Court were to accept this argument, however, it would amount to 
a sub silentio overruling of Dirks, which distinguished careless from self-serving 
breaches. Notwithstanding the novelty of the argument, there surely would be 
a few justices who would vote to close another “loophole” in the law of insider 
trading, as the Court did in O’Hagan. 
Justice Powell, the architect of Chiarella and Dirks, would be less apt to see 
the space as a loophole.42 Although he recognized he was making common law, 
his approach was conservative. He was not pushing the boundaries of the 
common law with his insider trading opinions, although he was far from 
adhering religiously to established doctrine. Instead, he viewed his approach as 
consistent with the established practices of ethical businessmen.43  
The main drawback of the government’s version of the personal benefit test 
is that it would stress the scienter element of Rule 10b-5 by requiring juries to 
make challenging determinations of fraudulent intent. In Dirks, Powell 
developed the personal benefit standard—which goes to the question of duty—
to cabin insider trading to actual cases of fraud; self-enrichment is a prototypical 
badge of fraud.  
In devising the personal benefit standard, Powell also sought to protect the 
distribution of information to the analyst community.44 Presuming a gift from 
the fact of disclosure would effectively undo Dirks and the space that Powell 
sought to preserve for analysts. The SEC has gone a considerable distance toward 
this result already with its enactment of Regulation FD, which prohibits 
selective disclosure by public companies.45 What the SEC has not done, 
however, is adopt a rule making such disclosures (or their receipt) fraudulent,46 
which would expose violators to criminal enforcement. Bringing the weight of 
criminal law to the fight against selective disclosure appears to be the DOJ’s goal 
in its recent crackdown on insider trading involving expert networks. Indeed, 
 
an improper gift of confidential corporate information is unassailable. After all, he did 
not have to make any disclosure, so why tell Maio anything?”). 
 41. More importantly from the government’s perspective, this test would give the widest 
possible scope to the insider trading ban under Rule 10b-5. Of course, there is another, 
equally clear bright-line test that could apply: the requirement of an explicit quid pro 
quo for the disclosure of the information. One assumes that the government would be 
less pleased with that rule, despite its clarity. 
 42. Cf. Pritchard, supra note 29, at 32-34 (showing Powell’s rejection of the misappropriation 
theory as inconsistent with Chiarella and Dirks). 
 43. See Pritchard, supra note 30 at 936 & n.585.  
 44. A.C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68 SMU L. REV. 857, 860-61 (2015). 
 45. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-103 (2015).   
 46. Id. at § 243.102 (“No failure to make a public disclosure required solely by [Regulation FD] 
shall be deemed to be violation of Rule 10b-5 . . . .”). 
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the government pointed to Reg. FD as supporting the convictions in Newman.47 
Presuming selective disclosures are fraudulent would aggressively expand Rule 
10b-5’s common law prohibition. 
The criminal implications of a broader interpretation might give pause to 
even the most enthusiastic proponents of market integrity. Some of the Justices 
may worry that the government is criminalizing previously accepted market 
behavior through a novel interpretation of Rule 10b-5 rather than seeking 
legislation, or at least rulemaking. The theme of Salman’s brief in the Supreme 
Court is that due process concerns regarding fair notice, bolstered by a dash of 
separation of powers, counsel in favor of the Court’s adopting a narrow quid pro 
quo standard for personal benefit.48  
Salman’s proposed standard would prohibit outright swaps of corporate 
information for cash and little else. The implicit suggestion is that Congress 
should fix the law if it thinks the narrow standard leaves too much space for 
market abuse. Unfortunately for Salman, too much water has gone under the 
bridge for the Court to now repudiate its role in developing Rule 10b-5’s 
common law of insider trading. Even if the Court wanted to abdicate the space 
in favor of Congress, Congress has at least ratified the idea of a common law 
insider trading prohibition by enacting legislation in 1984 and 1988 ramping up 
the penalties for insider trading.49 For better or worse, the Court is likely stuck 
managing the common law of insider trading under Rule 10b-5.  
How should the Court deal with the ambiguities and hard questions raised 
by that prohibition going forward? In my view, notwithstanding the bedrock 
status of Chenery II in administrative law, the Court should not defer to the SEC 
when it develops rules through adjudication if those rules carry potential 
criminal consequences. The Court should follow Powell’s lead, as the Second 
Circuit did in Newman, by interpreting Rule 10b-5’s insider trading prohibition 
narrowly. The Court could say, consistent with both Dirks and Newman, that an 
indirect personal benefit that a tipper receives from conferring a gift requires a 
meaningfully close personal relationship with the beneficiary. After all, Rule 
10b-5 is about fraud, not carelessness,50 and a requirement of some substantial 
emotional attachment for a gift to count as an indirect personal benefit would 
go a long way toward shoring up the amorphous line between negligence and 
scienter.  
 
 47. Petition for Rehearing & Rehearing En Banc at 21, United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 
438 (2d Cir. Jan. 23, 2015) (No. 13-1837(L)) (“[S]elective disclosure of earnings would be 
unlawful under SEC Regulation FD . . . and a jury could infer that Newman and 
Chiasson, as sophisticated securities professionals, knew that.”). 
 48. See generally Brief for Petitioner, Salman v. United States, No. 15-628 (U.S. May 6, 2016). 
 49. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 
Stat. 4677 (1988); Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 
(1984). 
 50. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976). 
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Construing unwritten prohibitions narrowly assuages fair notice concerns. 
A requirement of a substantial personal relationship would also limit the 
government’s ability to pursue merely negligent behavior. That worry is 
particularly acute with respect to the SEC, which does not labor under the 
criminal burden of proof. Moreover, the lower courts have been quite generous 
in applying the elements of Rule 10b-5 to the SEC’s claims. That has created real 
mischief when those generous precedents are applied in a criminal context, as 
the Government sought to do in Newman.51 Upholding Newman’s meaningful 
personal relationship standard while affirming Salman’s conviction allows the 
Court to take a middle course, constraining government overreach without 
abandoning a common law approach.52 
Obtaining material information of dubious province, as the Newman 
defendants did, is more of a gray area. If the SEC thinks a broad prohibition 
limiting the use of confidential information is essential to the health of securities 
markets, it should adopt such a rule, or better yet, ask Congress for legislation. 
Other countries have adopted statutory prohibitions to police insider trading as 
a form of market abuse rather than trying to cram a prohibition into the 
confines of common law fraud.53 Either rulemaking or legislation could spell 
out the breadth of the insider trading prohibition explicitly, giving fair notice 
to individuals participating in the securities markets. SEC sympathizers will 
worry that a narrow decision in Salman would be met by legislative impasse in 
Congress. Some wrongdoers would then escape the punishment they deserve. 
But each miscreant who escapes justice will be lobbying fodder for the SEC if it 
decides to ask Congress for legislation. Congress, not administrative agencies, 
should take responsibility for enacting criminal prohibitions in a democracy 
committed to the rule of law.  
 
 
 51. In a criminal case, the government must prove that the defendant’s breach is “willful,” 
Securities and Exchange Act § 32, but the space between that standard and § 10(b)’s 
scienter requirement is scant, and easy for a jury to lose track of in a case of criminal 
securities fraud. 
 52. Few would doubt that helping one’s brother is an indirect personal benefit. There 
remains the question of whether this standard is consistent with Newman’s formulation 
of the test, which requires “an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents 
at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.” Newman, 773 F.3d at 
452. The Supreme Court is unlikely to worry much about this detail of the Second 
Circuit’s opinion. In any event, is a brother’s gratitude “a potential gain of a . . . similarly 
valuable nature”? Most people would not trade their sibling’s love for money. 
 53. See generally Edward Greene & Olivia Schmid, Duty-Free Insider Trading?, 2013 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 369 (discussing insider trading law in the United Kingdom and the European 
Union). 
